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ABSTRACT 
 
Research suggests that intuitions about thought experiments are vulnerable to a wide array of 
seemingly irrelevant factors.  I argue that when arguments hinge on the use of intuitions about 
thought experiments, research on the subtle factors that affect intuitions must be taken seriously.  
To demonstrate how failing to consider such psychological influences can undermine an argument, 
I discuss Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.  I argue that by failing to consider the 
impact of subtle psychological influences such as order effects, Pereboom likely mis-identifies 
what really leads us to have the intuitions that we have about his cases, and this in turn undermines 
his argument for incompatibilism. Last, I consider objections and discuss how to empirically test 
my hypothesis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers commonly use thought experiments and hypothetical cases to bolster their 
arguments.  While many believe that intuitions about these cases are reliable, recent empirical 
research shows that certain features of some hypothetical scenarios may lead our intuitions to be 
unreliable.  For instance, philosophers who contribute to the “negative” program in experimental 
philosophy have demonstrated that intuitions vary according to ethnicity (Weinberg et al. 2001), 
gender (Buckwalter and Stich 2011), and linguistic background (Vaesen et al. 2013).1  Further 
research shows that moral judgments are significantly influenced by trivial and irrelevant factors 
of hypothetical cases, such as the order in which information is presented (Weigmann et al. 2012; 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012), the way in which information is worded (Petrinovich and 
O’Neill 1996), the emotional state of the reader (King and Hicks 2011; He et al. 2013; Guiseppe 
et al. 2012), and even the smell of Lysol (Tobia et al. 2013).  Furthermore, there is also 
overwhelming evidence that humans are unaware that such factors influence their judgments (King 
and Hicks 2011; Mlodinow 2012; Li et al. 2008), and even that philosophers are susceptible to 
unconscious psychological influences (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012; Tobia 2013). Despite 
these complications, philosophers frequently assume intuitions regarding thought experiments are 
driven by reliable processes and relevant features of the thought experiments.  Because intuitions 
seem to vary across demographics and seem to be significantly influenced by irrelevant features, 
some argue that intuitions about thought experiments should not count as evidence in support of 
philosophical views (Weinberg 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008).  
                                                          
1 Experimental philosophy’s “negative program,” generally seeks to challenge the usefulness of appealing 
to intuitions as a legitimate philosophical methodology for uncovering justified beliefs (Alexander, Mallon, 
and Weinberg 2014). 
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While I do not address the complications which arise from intuitions varying across 
demographics (in part, because some these complications may not be as concerning as they first 
appear (Adelberg, Thompson, and Nahmias forthcoming)), I do argue that there are good reasons 
to maintain that some intuitions that are relied upon for philosophical argumentation are 
significantly influenced by seemingly irrelevant factors.  To be clear, I will not be arguing that it 
is never legitimate to rely upon intuitions (Weinberg 2008) or even that moral heuristics distort 
our intuitions to the point that we have good reason not to trust them in certain situations (Sinnott-
Armstrong, Young, and Cushman 2009).  Instead, I argue that we need to consider whether 
unconscious psychological influences that affect our intuitions and moral judgments may 
undermine the use of intuitions in some philosophical arguments.  Given both the influence that 
these factors have on intuitions about thought experiments and how important it is that intuitions 
about thought experiments are tracking the right kinds of features, I argue there are some instances 
where intuitions can be better explained by these psychological features of which we are not aware 
than by the relevant features of thought experiments.  Therefore, when presenting an argument that 
relies on an explanation for what features of a case motivate intuitions about that case, one must 
acknowledge these features as alternative explanations for intuitions.  Failure to consider 
psychological influences, some of which may be entirely unconscious, as alternative explanations 
for what drives intuitions would be a methodological error and could undermine philosophical 
arguments.   
To demonstrate how failing to take these psychological influences, such as order effects, 
into account when doing philosophy can undermine one’s argument, I discuss Derk Pereboom’s 
(2014, 2002) four-case manipulation argument for incompatibilism.  I begin in section 2 by 
discussing manipulation arguments in general and I describe what conditions they must meet in 
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order to be successful. In section 3, I introduce Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument and 
draw attention to how important it is for Pereboom that he offers the best explanation for what 
generates the intuitions that we have about his four cases.  In section 4, I introduce unconscious 
psychological factors that likely drive intuitions about Pereboom’s manipulation cases.  Because 
these factors significantly influence intuitions and moral judgments and yet Pereboom fails to 
address them in his explanation, Pereboom’s manipulation argument fails to meet all of the 
conditions required in order for a manipulation argument to succeed as an argument for 
incompatibilism. Therefore, by neglecting to take into account order effects and unconscious 
influences that drive order effects, Pereboom’s argument for incompatibilism is open to a serious 
objection and is likely undermined.  In section 5, I consider objections to my argument and discuss 
how we could design empirical tests to determine whether my hypothesis is correct.  While my 
argument currently has only indirect empirical support, by bringing attention to the wealth of 
empirical research that suggests there are other judgment-influencing factors than the ones 
Pereboom addresses, the burden of proof falls on Pereboom to demonstrate that his explanation 
for what drives intuitions in response to his thought experiments is indeed the best explanation.  
 
2 MANIPULATION CASES AND ARGUMENTS 
Manipulation cases, generally, are introduced to serve as counterexamples to compatibilism, where 
compatibilism is the thesis that determinism does not necessarily rule out free will and moral 
responsibility.  While definitions for terms like ‘free will’ and ‘moral responsibility’ are far from 
universally agreed upon, for the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt Derk Pereboom’s (2014) 
definitions of these terms. Pereboom adopts Mele’s (2006) notion of free will and takes it “to refer 
to the strongest sort of control in action required for a core sense of moral responsibility…” The 
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notion of moral responsibility Pereboom (2014, p. 2) discusses is the sort that “is set apart by the 
notion of basic desert…For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it 
to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally 
wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally exemplary.” 
Using characterizations such as these, Pereboom and other proponents of manipulation arguments 
have argued that causal determinism is incompatible with the sort of free will required for moral 
responsibility, where causal determinism is defined as the thesis that every event is determined by 
earlier events and the laws of nature.   Though free will and moral responsibility are closely related, 
manipulation arguments have recently focused on moral responsibility.  Therefore, while many of 
the concepts I discuss will also be applicable to the free will debate, I will focus solely on issues 
of moral responsibility for the remainder of this thesis. 
Whereas Derk Pereboom and incompatibilists in general argue that determinism precludes 
moral responsibility, compatibilists argue this is not necessarily the case.  Although according to 
compatibilism, determinism does not necessarily undermine moral responsibility, there certainly 
seems to be some factors which do undermine responsibility.  For example, if an agent is coerced 
or physically forced to perform a certain act, then they would not be morally responsible.  As a 
result of the somewhat complex position they hold, compatibilists have taken up the task of 
attempting to explain under what conditions an agent is morally responsible.  Some popular 
compatibilist requirements for an agent to be considered morally responsible for an action are that 
an agent’s effective desire to act must appropriately conform with her second-order desires 
(Frankfurt 1971), the agent must be reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza 1998), and the agent 
must be able to appropriately develop and revise over time the character traits that motivate her 
actions (Mele 1995; 2006; Haji 1998; 2009). 
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Given this understanding of the compatibilist view, there are two ways in which a 
manipulation argument might be problematic for compatibilism.  One way a manipulation 
argument would be problematic is if it successfully described a scenario in which an agent lacks 
moral responsibility despite having met all compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility.  
This is typically what the first case of any manipulation argument attempts to show.  In order for 
a manipulation case to be a successful counterexample to the compatibilist account of moral 
responsibility, the following conditions must be met. 
Condition 1: All compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility must 
be met. 
 
Condition 2: The relevant readers2 of the manipulation case must intuitively 
find the manipulated agent either to lack moral responsibility. 
  
Condition 3: Readers who have the intuition that the manipulated agent 
lacks moral responsibility or has diminished levels of moral responsibility 
must be properly conceiving all the relevant features of the manipulation 
case. 
 
If any of these conditions are not met, then the manipulation case fails as a counterexample to 
compatibilism.  For example, if all compatibilist conditions are not met (Condition 1), then the 
manipulation case could not succeed in showing how all of these compatibilist requirements are 
insufficient for moral responsibility, since the missing compatibilist condition might explain why 
the agent lacks responsibility.  If readers of the manipulation case do not have the intuition that the 
manipulated agent lacks moral responsibility or at least has diminished moral responsibility for 
the action described (Condition 2), then the argument fails as an argument against compatibilism 
since it fails to provide the reader with solid grounds to suppose that there is a problem with 
compatibilism.  Last, if the intuition that a manipulated agent lacks moral responsibility is the 
result of misunderstanding what role the compatibilist capacities play in the situation or 
                                                          
2 I discuss which readers should be considered “relevant” in section 3 below. 
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misunderstanding some important aspect of the manipulation case (Condition 3), then this intuition 
would carry no weight in demonstrating that compatibilist requirements are insufficient to secure 
moral responsibility.  In order to correctly provide a counterexample for a philosophical position, 
one must be objecting to the actual position, not to a straw man version or confused version of that 
position.  If, however, these three conditions are met, then it seems we are justified in using 
intuitions about a manipulation case to show that the compatibilist account of moral responsibility 
fails to capture all that is required for an agent to be morally responsible. 
It is important to note, though, that introducing a manipulation case which meets these 
three conditions merely provides a counterexample to the currently-proposed compatibilist 
account of moral responsibility.  That is, this manipulation case alone does not undermine the 
possibility that determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.  Rather, it merely 
demonstrates that the requirements which compatibilists currently cite as being necessary for 
moral responsibility are not sufficient for moral responsibility. In response to a successful 
manipulation argument which meets the three conditions I described above, a compatibilist can 
always respond by adding another requirement that is necessary for moral responsibility.   
For example, suppose an agent, Bob, meets all compatibilist requirements for moral 
responsibility, but Bob also has a migraine that causes his reasoning to be slightly altered in such 
a way that he decides to kill David and he would have not made this decision if he had not had this 
migraine.  If the first three conditions are met (readers correctly conceive of Bob as meeting all 
compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility and yet they intuit that Bob is not morally 
responsible), then we would have found a counterexample to the compatibilist account of moral 
responsibility.  However, this does not support incompatibilism since this case says nothing about 
whether determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.  Rather it would only demonstrate 
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that Bob’s migraine is incompatible with Bob being morally responsible. Since Bob’s migraine 
has nothing to do with determinism, this case does not support incompatibilism.  Therefore, the 
compatibilist could add that in order to be morally responsible, an agent must not have the kind of 
migraine Bob had.  This would fix the complication for compatibilism while being irrelevant to 
discussions of incompatibilism.  Another example of a manipulation case that meets these three 
conditions but does not support incompatibilism is Mele’s (1995) case of an agent who has 
someone else’s values implanted into them overnight. Mele seems to have succeeded in finding a 
problem with compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility since they had previously failed to 
consider that in order to be morally responsible, one must have a causal history that allows them 
to appropriately revise and develop their character over time. However, Mele does not necessarily 
undermine compatibilism completely or succeed in arguing for incompatibilism with this case.   
Thus, in addition to demonstrating that there is a hole in the compatibilist account, 
proponents of manipulation cases who intend to argue for incompatibilism need to further argue 
that the responsibility-undermining feature present in the manipulation case is also present in a 
deterministic universe. If the proponent of a manipulation argument can successfully demonstrate 
that the manipulated agent’s responsibility is undermined by some feature which is also necessarily 
present in a deterministic universe, then the entire compatibilist view of moral responsibility would 
be undermined since moral responsibility would not be compatible with determinism.  Therefore, 
in addition to merely finding a complication for compatibilism, showing that compatibilism is 
untenable requires that manipulation arguments meet a fourth condition: 
 Condition 4: The responsibility-undermining feature of the manipulation 
case must be a feature of determinism. 
 
Satisfying Condition 4 would result in a manipulation argument that not only provides a 
counterexample to specific proposed compatibilist accounts, but that also provides a successful 
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positive argument for incompatibilism.  In order to demonstrate that Condition 4 is met, proponents 
of manipulation arguments attempt to show that manipulated agents are not relevantly dissimilar 
to agents in a deterministic universe.  In order to demonstrate the similarity between a manipulation 
case and a world where everything is causally determined by the past and natural laws, proponents 
of manipulation cases often follow up the presentation of a manipulation case with similar cases 
or cases involving only determinism and argue that there are no relevant dissimilarities between 
the former and latter cases.  Such manipulation cases can roughly be understood to have the 
formulation below (McKenna 2008; Mele 2008). I will refer to this formulation as MA: 
(P1) The manipulated agent is not morally responsible.   
 
(P2) There is no difference relevant for moral responsibility between the 
manipulated agent and an agent in a deterministic universe.  
 
(C) Therefore, an agent in a deterministic universe is not morally 
responsible. 
 
Assuming that the manipulation case described in P1 meets the three conditions I spelled out 
above, the truth of P1 would demonstrate that the compatibilist requirements for moral 
responsibility are insufficient.  Given P1, the truth of P2 would demonstrate that the responsibility-
undermining feature present in a manipulation case is also present in a case involving only 
determinism and, thus, compatibilism is untenable.  In order to defend P2, the responsibility-
undermining feature in all cases must be a feature which is present in a case involving only 
determinism (ideally, determinism is the only feature present in the last case of a manipulation 
argument).  If the only relevant feature in the last case of a manipulation argument is determinism, 
and there are supposed to be no morally relevant differences between cases, then all features of the 
first case which are not present in a deterministic universe must be irrelevant to moral 
responsibility.  If it turns out that any features that are present in earlier cases are relevant to moral 
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responsibility and are not present in a case involving only determinism, then P2 does not hold and 
the manipulation argument is unsuccessful. Furthermore, while cases may share many insignificant 
properties that are irrelevant to determinism, it must be shown that these shared features are not 
driving intuitions. However, it is one of the goals of this thesis to impress upon the reader the 
vulnerability of intuitions – that intuitions are often significantly affected by unintended and 
seemingly irrelevant features of thought experiments.  Therefore, these seemingly insignificant 
features are in fact highly significant if they significantly affect intuitions and moral judgments.  
Therefore, in order for P2 to hold, no features other than those present in a causally determined 
universe can influence the relevant readers’ intuitions and judgments of moral responsibility.   
 Another way to describe the general framework of manipulation arguments is to understand 
that they are accepting a couple of general principles in order to inductively conclude that 
determinism rules out moral responsibility.  For instance, proponents of manipulation arguments 
are appealing to intuitions in order to determine what does and does not undermine moral 
responsibility.  Therefore, at least within the realm of moral reasoning we can assume that they 
accept what I will call the Intuition Principle:  
(IP) If people consistently intuit that X, then there is good (though defeasible) 
reason to believe that X is true.  
 
I am not assuming that this reasoning applies to all intuitions, but this seems to be a common 
methodology for justifying claims about morality and moral responsibility and is employed by 
proponents of manipulation cases as well as many other philosophers debating questions about 
morality.   
Secondly, though some have argued that manipulation arguments do not need to offer an 
explanation for the intuitions in response to the cases (Mele, 2005; 2008), I argue, in agreement 
with Mickelson (2015), that providing an explanation for what drives intuitions of non-
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responsibility is of utmost importance.  Those who use manipulation arguments to support 
incompatibilism need to demonstrate that some feature of determinism rules out the possibility of 
an agent’s being morally responsible.  In order to show which feature undermines responsibility, 
one needs to demonstrate that the manipulated agent’s lack of moral responsibility is explained by 
the presence of some deterministic feature.  Thus, in order to argue that determinism precludes 
moral responsibility, proponents of manipulation cases should also endorse what I consider the 
Incompatibility Principle: 
(IncP) If A best explains why an agent is not morally responsible, then we 
have good reason to believe that A is incompatible with moral 
responsibility. 
 
If we fill in X and A in these two principles with features of manipulation cases by adding that 
people reliably intuit that manipulated agents are not morally responsible and that features of 
determinism best explain why the manipulated agents lack moral responsibility, then the 
manipulation argument can be roughly formulated as below: 
M1) If people consistently intuit that the manipulated agent is not morally 
responsible, then there is good reason to believe the manipulated agent 
is not morally responsible. 
M2) People consistently intuit that the manipulated agent is not morally 
responsible.  
M3) Therefore, there is good reason to believe the manipulated agent is not 
morally responsible. 
M4) If features of determinism best explain why the manipulated agent is 
not morally responsible, then we have good reason to believe features 
of determinism are incompatible with moral responsibility. 
M5) Features of determinism best explain why the manipulated agent is not 
morally responsible. 
C) Therefore, we have good reason to believe features of determinism are 
incompatible with moral responsibility. 
 
This presentation of manipulation arguments make explicit some of the inductive reasoning that 
that is required in order for the manipulation argument to succeed.  The above formulation 
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highlights two things: (1) our reliance on intuitions to infer conclusions about moral responsibility, 
and (2) just how much hinges on precisely what best explains why manipulated agents lack moral 
responsibility.  Since what motivates intuitions about manipulation cases is extremely important 
for manipulation arguments, these arguments, and ones with similar reliance on intuitions, must 
take intuition-affecting psychological influences into consideration in order to be immune from 
the objection that we only find them compelling because of those psychological influences.  I argue 
that ignoring these unconscious psychological influences and heuristics can undermine one’s 
argument.  
In order to provide a specific example of an argument that is threatened by neglecting to 
account for such factors, I present Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Using the 
presentation of manipulation arguments I have described above, this thesis will focus on rejecting 
premise M5 by arguing that features of determinism do not best explain why the manipulated agent 
lacks moral responsibility.  Rather, I argue that something independent of the features of 
determinism best explains why people judge that manipulated agents lack moral responsibility.  
Therefore, something other than determinism would be incompatible with moral responsibility and 
the manipulation argument for incompatibilism is unsuccessful.  Given the way in which Derk 
Pereboom’s manipulation argument is presented, it seems extremely likely that seemingly 
irrelevant psychological influences, such as the order in which he presents his cases, provide a 
better explanation than the one which Pereboom offers for why readers intuit that determined 
agents are not morally responsible.   
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3 PEREBOOM’S FOUR-CASE MANIPULATION ARGUMENT 
To demonstrate that once determinism is properly understood, compatibilism fails, Derk Pereboom 
(2014) presents a manipulation argument. Pereboom attempts to convince his audience that even 
in cases when all compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility are met, agents can still lack 
moral responsibility.  He also intends to convince readers of his argument that moral responsibility 
is undermined by features of causal determinism.  While it is important to know exactly who 
Pereboom’s intended audience is and to what degree such an audience actually exists, determining 
these matters is difficult and I will not spend much time speculating.  However, Pereboom seems 
to be targeting both compatibilists and philosophers who are agnostic about the free will debate.  
He states, “…the manipulation argument aims to persuade the natural compatibilist and the 
agnostic their resistance to incompatibilism is best given up.” (2014, p. 81) Therefore, I will 
assume for the remainder of this thesis that Pereboom intends the readers of his argument to be 
either compatibilists or agnostic philosophers.   
In order to convert these natural compatibilists and agnostic readers to incompatibilism, 
Pereboom presents four cases.  Each case involves an agent, Plum, who is causally determined by 
factors beyond his control to kill another agent, White.  Additionally, in each case Plum satisfies 
all purported compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility. 3  Case 1 reads: 
A team of neuroscientists has the ability to manipulate Plum’s neural states 
at any time by radio-like technology. In this  particular case, they do so by 
pressing a button just before he begins to reason about his situation, which 
they know will produce in him a neural state that realizes a strongly egoistic 
reasoning process, which the neuroscientists know will deterministically 
result in his decision to kill White. Plum would not have killed White had 
the neuroscientists not intervened, since his reasoning would then not have 
been sufficiently egoistic to produce this decision. But at the same time, 
Plum’s effective first-order desire to kill White conforms to his second-
                                                          
3 Pereboom asserts that in all four cases Plum satisfies the requirements which Hume (1739/1978), Harry 
Frankfurt (1971), John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), Jay Wallace (1994), and Alfred Mele (1995; 
2006) have argued are necessary for an agent to be considered morally responsible.  
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order desires. In addition, his process of deliberation from which the 
decision results is reasons-responsive; in particular, this type of process 
would have resulted in Plum’s refraining from deciding to kill White in 
certain situations in which his reasons were different. His reasoning is 
consistent with his character because it is frequently egoistic and sometimes 
strongly so. Still, it is not in general exclusively egoistic, because he 
sometimes successfully regulates his behavior by moral reasons, especially 
when the egoistic reasons are relatively weak. Plum is also not constrained 
to act as he does, for he does not act because of an irresistible desire – the 
neuroscientists do not induce a desire of this sort. (Pereboom 2014 p. 76-
77) 
 
Case 2 is similar to Case 1 “except that a team of neuroscientists programmed him at the beginning 
of his life so that his reasoning is often but not always egoistic,” (2014, p. 77) as opposed to Plum’s 
being manipulated just before he reasoned about his situation as occurs in Case 1. Again, Plum 
maintains all compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility and yet Plum is intuitively not 
morally responsible for his decision to kill White.  In Case 3, it is the training practices of Plum’s 
community, which were completed before he developed the ability to prevent or alter these 
practices, that causally determined the nature of his deliberative reasoning process such that he 
reasons egoistically and kills White (2014, p. 78).  In Case 4 of Pereboom’s manipulation 
argument, Plum is an ordinary human being, raised in normal circumstances in a world where 
everything, including Plum’s egoistic decision to kill White, is causally determined by its past 
states and the laws of nature.  Again, in all four cases Plum satisfies all purported compatibilist 
requirements for moral responsibility and Plum’s actions are ultimately determined by factors 
outside of his control.4   
Given this presentation, whether Pereboom’s argument successfully poses a problem for 
compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility depends on its meeting the three conditions I 
                                                          
4 While Demetriou (2010) argues it may be metaphysically impossible for the manipulation Pereboom 
describes to occur without inviting either a hard- or soft-line response, for the purposes of this thesis, I will 
assume a metaphysically coherent interpretation of Pereboom’s manipulation does exist. 
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presented earlier; all compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility must be met, readers must 
intuitively find Plum to lack moral responsibility, and readers who have the intuition that Plum 
lacks moral responsibility must be properly conceiving all of the features of these cases.  Pereboom 
would argue that all of his four cases meet these requirements, and thus, present a serious problem 
for compatibilism. 
Nonetheless, it seems Pereboom is attempting to do more than provide a counterexample 
for compatibilism.  We can see that Pereboom additionally intends to make a positive argument 
for incompatibilism by demonstrating that it is a feature of causal determinism that is incompatible 
with moral responsibility. 
The salient factor that can plausibly explain why Plum is not responsible in 
all of the cases is that in each he is causally determined by factors beyond 
his control to decide as he does.  This is therefore a sufficient, and I think 
also the best, explanation for his non-responsibility in all of the cases. (2014, 
p. 79) 
 
By attempting to show that a feature of determinism (Plum’s actions are ultimately causally 
determined by factors beyond his control) explains intuitions of Plum’s non-responsibility across 
all four cases, Pereboom is attempting to demonstrate that his argument also meets Condition 4, 
namely, that the responsibility-undermining feature of the manipulation case is a feature of 
determinism. 
Before I present my argument, it is worth noting that there are in fact reasons to doubt 
whether the first three conditions, which are necessary in order for any manipulation case to 
succeed in poking holes in the compatibilist account of moral responsibility, are actually satisfied.  
For instance, some have argued that all of the compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility 
either cannot be met or are not met in manipulation cases like the one Pereboom describes (Waller 
2013; Demetriou 2010).  If this is the case, then Condition 1 is not satisfied.  Also, there is some 
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evidence that readers don’t actually have the intuition that Plum lacks moral responsibility (Feltz 
2013).  If this is the case, then Condition 2 is not satisfied.  Lastly, experimental philosophy has 
provided reason to believe that readers are easily confused about what determinism properly entails 
(Murray and Nahmias 2014) and that most readers fail to understand manipulated agents as having 
all of the necessary compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility (Sripada 2011).  If this is 
the case, then Condition 3 is not satisfied and hence these intuitions cannot be used by Pereboom 
to support his anti-compatibilist argument.  However, while these are significant problems for 
Pereboom’s argument, I wish to draw attention to the problem that arises from potentially failing 
to meet Condition 4.  Specifically, I argue that the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible 
in all four cases is not motivated by some feature of determinism, but by unconscious 
psychological influences that are not relevant to the truth of determinism (like order effects).  If I 
am right, then Pereboom’s four cases fail to meet Condition 4 and, thus, his argument for 
incompatibilism fails. 
Given that Pereboom is attempting to show both that the compatibilist conditions for moral 
responsibility are insufficient and that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, a 
single feature of these cases (Plum’s actions are ultimately determined by factors outside his 
control) needs to explain why it is that individuals intuitively find Plum not morally responsible.  
If intuitions that Plum lacks responsibility result from any other aspects of the argument, then 
Pereboom’s argument fails.  This is because something independent of the features of determinism 
would best explain why people judge that Plum lacks moral responsibility, and thus, something 
other than determinism would be incompatible with moral responsibility.   
In all four of Pereboom’s cases Plum’s actions are certainly determined by factors outside 
his control.  However, just because all four cases share this property, this does not necessarily 
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mean that this is the feature is what motivates the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible.  
As Mele (year, p. 79) cleverly explains, we should find Pereboom’s explanation about his four 
cases, 
…no more plausible than the claim that the best explanation for Scarlet’s 
car’s being damaged in the following three cases is that it was struck by an 
object that was, among other things, wet: (Case 1) Scarlet’s car was struck 
by a falling large wet lead pipe and was damaged as a result; (Case 2) 
Scarlet’s car was struck by a falling large wet wrench and was damaged as 
a result; (Case 3) Scarlet’s car was struck by a falling large wet metal 
candlestick and was damaged as a result. (In each case, the object fell ten 
metres.) The claim that I have just invited you to recall immediately 
precedes Pereboom’s assertion that ‘Because Plum is also causally 
determined in this way in Case 4,…we should conclude that here too Plum 
is not morally responsible for the same reason’ (116). As it happens, in case 
4 of the Scarlet chronicles, her car was struck by a falling large wet sponge. 
Peacocke concludes that Scarlet’s car is damaged in this case too. But, of 
course, she is wrong. It was such things as the hardness and weight of the 
falling objects, not their wetness, that did the work.  
Mele’s point here is that the mere fact that Plum’s actions are ultimately causally determined by 
factors outside his control in the first three cases and the fact that this feature is shared in the fourth 
case does not entail that we should expect the shared feature to do work in motivating intuitions 
regarding Case 4.  It is possible that there are other features of the first three cases that do work in 
undermining responsibility that do not necessarily apply to a case involving only determinism.  
  It is essential for the success of Pereboom’s argument for incompatibilism that his 
explanation for what motivates these intuitions is actually what motivates intuitions, and Pereboom 
must demonstrate that some feature of determinism is what actually does the work in his four-case 
argument.  In the next section, I argue that Pereboom’s presentation of the four-case argument 
leads to certain, largely unconscious, psychological influences driving our intuitions about Plum’s 
not being morally responsible. Since the effects of these psychological influences lead to order 
effects, I argue that order effects can provide a better explanation for why readers have the intuition 
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that Plum is not morally responsible in Case 4 and expose a weakness in Pereboom’s argument 
which potentially undermines his argument. 
Before moving forward and arguing for an alternative explanation for what drives our 
intuitions in Pereboom’s cases, I would first like to point out a number of potential confusions and 
offer a disclaimer about what I am not attempting to do. I am not putting forth a positive argument 
for compatibilism, nor am I even necessarily defending any compatibilist view.  I am merely 
highlighting problems with Pereboom’s argument for incompatibilism.  Also, I am not arguing 
that because some psychological factors influence intuitions and moral judgments, philosophers 
should refrain from ever appealing to intuitions and thought experiments.  I am merely providing 
evidence to suggest that if philosophers are going to rely on intuitions about thought experiments, 
then they will need to precisely determine what drives these intuitions if they wish to use those 
intuitions as premises in their arguments.  Philosophers who rely on intuitions need to take 
unconscious psychological influences into account when explaining what drives intuitions.   
Furthermore, I am not offering a hard-line response to manipulation arguments and arguing 
that Plum actually should be considered morally responsible in all four cases (McKenna 2008), 
nor am I necessarily taking a soft-line response and arguing that there is a relevant dissimilarity 
between two of the cases which allows us to consider Plum not morally responsible in Case 1 but 
morally responsible in Case 4 (Demetriou 2011; Waller 2013).5  While one might think that I need 
to either take a hard-line response and argue that P1 of MA is false or take the soft-line response 
and argue that P2 of MA is false, these positions are only required if one is attempting to argue 
                                                          
5 While my argument allows for one to reject P2 and therefore, in some sense, provides a soft-line 
response to Pereboom’s argument, I do not intend for my argument to only be a soft-line response.  
Rather, this is a plausible but not central product of this thesis.  I focus my attention on arguing that 
Pereboom fails to meet Condition 4 and does not provide the best explanation for intuitions regarding his 
four cases. 
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that there is no problem with the compatibilist account of moral responsibility.  However, I am not 
necessarily arguing that the manipulation arguments do not elucidate problems for compatibilism.   
Rather, I am showing Pereboom’s manipulation argument fails as an argument for 
incompatibilism. That is, though Pereboom’s four-case argument may or may not demonstrate a 
complication for the compatibilist account, I argue this complication would not succeed in 
demonstrating the truth of incompatibilism.  In arguing this, I raise methodological concerns like 
those Mele (2005) addresses and call into question Pereboom’s explanation for why we find Plum 
intuitively lacking moral responsibility.  I aim to undermine Pereboom's argument for 
incompatibilism by offering a better explanation for these intuitions. 
 
4 ORDER EFFECTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
In this section, I argue that order effects provide a better explanation for what motivates judgments 
of Plum’s non-responsibility in the four-case manipulation argument than Pereboom’s 
explanation.  That is, I argue that the intuitions readers have about Pereboom’s four cases are 
affected by the order in which the cases are presented, and that these intuitions would be different 
if they were presented in a different order, or if they were presented independently of one another.  
After providing evidence that the order in which Pereboom’s four cases are presented affects 
judgments about the extent to which Plum is morally responsible, I will discuss specific features 
and psychological mechanisms that likely lead to these order effects.  Though knowledge of the 
fact that human psychology is often subject to order effects may be reason enough to suspect that 
such a phenomenon is at play in Pereboom’s four-case argument, I will also discuss the 
possibilities that an agency-detection mechanism, the presence of agential intent in earlier cases, 
or emotional responses to Case 1 are motivating order effects, as there is empirical evidence which 
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suggests these psychological influences unconsciously motivate intuitions and result in order 
effects. 
Alex Weigmann, Yasmina Okan, and Jonas Nagel (2012) have demonstrated that the order 
in which trolley dilemmas are presented significantly influences judgments of moral 
permissibility.6  After presenting participants with five variations of the trolley dilemma, which 
differed only in what the life-saving action was, subjects' responses were affected by the order in 
which the cases were presented.7  Weigmann et al. concluded, “judgments would be most likely 
transferred if the initial rating was strongly negative” (2012, p. 825).  That is, when readers had a 
strongly negative judgment towards the first case, this judgment was likely to affect judgments of 
later cases.  This highly negative first case resulted in consistently more negative judgments of 
moral permissibility (relative to judgments of these cases presented on their own).  Though I will 
provide reasons for why readers might have strongly negative reaction to Pereboom’s Case 1, it is 
enough here to note that readers do have negative reactions to Case 1 and do judge Plum to lack 
moral responsibility (Feltz 2013).  Given these negative reactions to Case 1, I argue that reading 
Case 1 first affects judgments of moral responsibility of later cases much in the same way 
Wigmann et al. observed order affected judgments towards trolley dilemmas.  Therefore, if the 
Cases were presented in a different order – for instance, in reverse order – judgments would be 
significantly altered. 
                                                          
6Trolley dilemmas are scenarios where a trolley train is out of control and on track to run over multiple 
workers.  However, someone has the option of choosing to sacrifice the life of one person to save the 
multitude, and these scenarios vary according to how that sacrifice must be carried out. 
7 The potentially life-saving actions were: pressing a switch that will redirect the train that is out of control 
to a parallel track where one person will be run over; redirecting an empty train that is on a parallel track 
onto the main track to stop the train, running over a person that is on the connecting track; redirecting a 
train with a person inside that is on a parallel track onto the main track to stop the train; pushing a button 
that will open a trap door that will let a large person on top of a bridge fall and stop the train; push the large 
person from the bridge to stop the train.  
  
20 
While one might assume the experienced agnostic philosopher would not be affected by 
the order in which cases are presented, Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) found that order of 
presentation influenced the moral judgments of philosophers more than it did non-philosophers!  
Furthermore, this effect persists among philosophers who specialize in ethics (Schwitzgebel and 
Cushman forthcoming).  Not only do Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s findings suggest that 
philosophers need to take the salience of order effects seriously, but they could possibly provide 
reason to be more worried about these effects occurring in philosophy than in other areas. 
If it turned out that order effects better explain why we find Plum not morally responsible 
in later cases, then Pereboom would fail to provide the best explanation for these intuitions which 
are critical to his argument.  I am not claiming that, in principle, order effects undermine 
philosophical arguments.  However, if the argument is one that depends on being able to correctly 
identify what motivates intuitions about certain cases, as Pereboom’s argument for 
incompatibilism is, then the argument fails if it incorrectly identifies what motivates intuitions.  
Remember that the success of Pereboom’s argument for incompatibilism hinges on satisfying 
Condition 4 and showing that some feature of determinism motivates intuitions of non-
responsibility.  If I am right that these intuitions are not the result of some feature of determinism 
but of unconscious psychological influences that pick up on other largely irrelevant features of 
those four cases, then we lack reason to think that causal determinism is incompatible with moral 
responsibility and Pereboom’s argument is unsuccessful. 
4.1 Agency-Detection Mechanism  
The first psychological mechanism that I argue influences judgments regarding Pereboom’s four 
cases is an agency-detection mechanism.  Given that Case 1 clearly describes agents 
(neuroscientists) acting upon Plum, I argue that an agency-detection mechanism becomes active 
while reading Case 1 and this causes readers to erroneously think in agential terms when reading 
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Case 4 and thinking about what determinism entails.  This agency-detection mechanism would not 
be active if Pereboom presented Case 4 first, since only non-agential causal determinism acts on 
Plum in Case 4.  Because such a mechanism would influence judgments of Case 4 when Case 4 is 
presented last, but not influence judgments when Case 4 is presented first, the order of presentation 
affects intuitions, and, thus, on my account this mechanism contributes to the effect that the order 
of presentation has on intuitions about these cases. 
Scott Atran (2006) argues that human evolution has naturally selected for an innate and 
overly sensitive mechanism for detecting agents and agential properties.  While this mechanism 
often beneficially and accurately identifies agents, Atran argues that it also causes humans to 
wrongly attribute agential properties to nearly any complex or uncertain situation or design.  For 
example, Atran believes this overly sensitive mechanism explains why people often see faces in 
the clouds and are quick to believe in supernatural beings.  The reason Atran believes our agency-
detection mechanisms would be overly sensitive is because, evolutionarily speaking, it is much 
more costly to fail to attribute agency to a (potentially dangerous) agent than it would be to attribute 
agential features to non-agential things like clouds.  That is, we are likely to identify agential 
properties in situations where there are none present because it has been evolutionarily beneficial 
for us to do so. 
Such an agency-detection mechanism would become active when reading about the 
neuroscientists in Case 1 who determine Plum’s actions.  This would lead us to correctly attribute 
agential properties to the causal determinants of Plum’s actions.  However, given both the 
similarities between cases and Pereboom’s continual insistence that there are no relevant 
differences between cases, this agency-detection mechanism would likely remain active in later 
cases, including Case 4 when Pereboom eventually removes agents and agential properties from 
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the picture entirely and replaces them with the complex structure of causal determinism.  If this 
mechanism remained active, then readers would (likely unconsciously) attribute agential 
properties to the causal determinants of Plum’s actions in Case 4.  However, determinism has no 
such agential properties, and so if Pereboom's presentation of the cases causes readers to 
unwittingly assume that determinism has some form of agency, then Pereboom's presentation 
confuses the reader about the nature of determinism.8 
If this overly sensitive agency-detection mechanism does in fact influence intuitions about 
Case 4, then the order in which Pereboom presents these cases has an effect on judgments of 
Plum’s non-responsibility.  Furthermore, this alternative explanation for intuitions would 
undermine Pereboom’s goal of getting readers to properly understand the causal nature of 
determinism and result in the manipulation case failing to meet Condition 3.  Since determinism, 
and therefore Case 4, does not involve agents or agential properties which influence Plum, it would 
be misguided for intuitions about Case 4 to be influenced by agency.  If intuitions about Plum in 
Case 4 are motivated by an agency-detection mechanism responding to agency in earlier cases, as 
I argue they are, then these intuitions are unreliable and cannot be used to motivate Pereboom’s 
argument. 
4.2 Intent 
While the mere presence of agents in Case 1 might cause readers to judge Plum not morally 
responsible in Case 4, the intent of these agents also appears to contribute to the order effects.  
Phillips and Shaw (forthcoming) investigated how third-party intent (the intent of agents who 
causally determine how another agent acts but nonetheless are not necessarily acting or being 
affected by the action themselves) influences judgments of moral responsibility.  First, they found 
                                                          
8 In an unpublished manuscript, Neil Levy makes a similar argument, claiming that Pereboom’s four-case 
manipulation argument only succeeds insofar as it activates an agency-detection mechanism which causes 
the readers to see determinism in agential terms. 
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that the presence of third-party intent does reduce judgments of blame.9  Second, third-party intent 
only influenced judgments when the agent’s actions match the intended action. Third, their results 
suggest that intent affects judgments of moral responsibility by altering the reader’s causal 
perception.  If Pereboom’s four-case argument successfully alters one’s causal perception only 
because third-party intent is present in earlier cases, then judgments of earlier cases are influencing 
judgments of later cases.  If later judgments are being affected by earlier judgments, then the order 
of presentation again has an effect on our intuitions of non-responsibility.  If intuitions of Plum’s 
non-responsibility are the result of order effects, then we have an alternative explanation for these 
intuitions that is deeply problematic for Pereboom’s argument. 
To understand why it is problematic for third-party intent to alter our judgments here, 
consider the following: According to Pereboom, many people don’t see determinism as ruling out 
the possibility of moral responsibility because they misunderstand the true nature of determinism. 
To remedy these misconceptions, “the manipulation cases are formulated so as to correct for 
inadequacy in the extent to which we take into account hidden deterministic causes in our intuitions 
about ordinary cases” (2014, p. 95).  That is, manipulation cases are intended to expose to us the 
true causal nature of determinism and they attempt to alter how one perceives the causal 
implications of determinism. Phillips and Shaw hypothesize that manipulation cases can succeed 
in altering one’s causal perception only when third-party intent is present and matches the action 
performed.  Therefore, according to Phillips and Shaw’s assessment, if a change in causal 
perception occurs, it is because readers understand there to be third-party intent present which 
matched the action.  While Pereboom is clearly attempting to change the reader’s causal 
perception, it would be mistaken to alter perceptions by getting readers to understand determinism 
                                                          
9 These findings are consistent with Robyn Waller’s (2013) argument that intent is a relevant difference 
between cases and affects judgments of moral responsibility. 
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as having any intent (or, for that matter, any other agential properties) since compatibilists and 
incompatibilists agree that this is the wrong way to conceive of determinism.  This suggests that 
Pereboom's four cases elicit the desired intuitions by confusing readers about the true nature of 
determinism.  Again, since Pereboom needs the responsibility-undermining feature of all of his 
four cases to be a feature of determinism, and intent is not a feature of determinism, if intent is 
influencing judgments of non-responsibility, then Pereboom’s argument for incompatibilism faces 
a serious problem. 
While the concern outlined above is certainly problematic for Pereboom’s argument, it is 
worth noting that in order for my argument to succeed, intent doesn’t necessarily need to confuse 
readers about the true nature of determinism.  Rather, I merely need to demonstrate that the intent, 
along with other unconscious psychological influences, leads to order effects that influence 
judgments, and that these order effects explain intuitions of non-responsibility better than the mere 
fact that Plum’s actions are ultimately determined by factors over which he has no control.10 
4.3 Emotional Responses 
Another psychological influence that likely causes the order of presentation to have an effect on 
judgments is emotional engagement with features present in Case 1. The first case of the four-case 
argument involves agential intent, an abnormal bodily violation (brain manipulation), and an 
abnormal social violation (manipulation).  Reading vignettes that contain intent, abnormal bodily 
violations, and abnormal social violations has been shown to elicit emotional responses of disgust 
and anger (Giner-Sorolla 2011; Haidt 2003). Also, engaging emotionally with such vignettes has 
been shown both to be correlated with particular moral judgments (Greene 2001), as well as to 
                                                          
10 In a response to Mele’s criticisms, Pereboom (2014, 82) argues that even if these intentional agents “were 
replaced by force fields or machines that randomly form in space that have the same deterministic effect on 
Plum as the manipulators do, the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible persists.”  While I remain 
skeptical of this claim, it is interesting that Pereboom chooses not to make this replacement and he only 
mentions such a possibility after priming the reader with cases involving intentional agents.    
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influence moral judgments (Haidt 2003; Guiseppe et al. 2012), even when these emotions are 
primed non-consciously and automatically (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006).11  Furthermore, 
responding to a vignette with anger or disgust has been shown to affect judgments and behavior 
for some time after reading the vignette (Plaisier and Konijn 2013; He et al. 2013).  
In light of such evidence, it is likely that readers of Pereboom’s four-case argument would 
have a strongly negative emotional response to Case 1, and that this highly negative response 
would subsequently keep influencing our judgments all the way through to Case 4.  Insofar as 
one’s emotions are negatively responding to agential intent, body violations, or social violations, 
and not to the fact that Plum’s actions are causally determined by factors over which he has no 
control, emotional engagement serves as a plausible confounding variable for what explains our 
judgments.  That is, if our intuitions about Plum are the result of responding to emotional-priming 
factors that are irrelevant to determinism, then it isn’t a feature of determinism that drives moral 
judgments, as Pereboom argues.  Since features of Case 1 elicit emotional reactions, emotional 
engagement with features present in Case 1 influence judgments of later cases, thus leading to 
order effects taking place.  These order effects, again, serve as an alternative explanation for 
intuitions of Plum’s non-responsibility in Case 4 and thereby threaten the success of Pereboom’s 
four-case manipulation argument. In summary, I argue that given Pereboom’s presentation of his 
four-case manipulation argument, features only present in earlier cases (agents, third-party intent, 
abnormal body and social violations) are triggering certain unconscious psychological 
mechanisms that drive judgments of Case 4, thus resulting in order effects.  Since these features 
are independent of any features of determinism, it would seem that something other than 
                                                          
11 Haidt (2001) argues that in most circumstances, emotional engagement is the primary cause of moral 
reasoning. While this may or may not be the case, for my argument to work, it only needs to be the case 
that emotional engagement influences judgments of Pereboom’s four cases. 
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determinism is motivating our moral intuitions and, therefore, Pereboom’s argument for 
incompatibilism fails.  
There may be additional psychological influences that drive order effects which I have not 
discussed.  For example, intuitions might also be swayed by one’s own demands for consistency 
across cases.  That is, if readers are torn between whether we should consider Plum morally 
responsible in later cases and understand that the cases are similar in many ways, – and again, note 
that Pereboom reminds the reader that the cases are alike in all other regards – they are likely to 
answer consistently with how they did in earlier cases. Thus, if readers commit to saying that Plum 
is not morally responsible in Case 1, it is likely that they would answer consistently across cases 
merely for the sake of having consistent responses.   
Another possible factor that might influence judgments, which Pereboom does not address, 
is that readers might have intuitions of non-responsibility about the four cases simply because 
Pereboom makes suggestions about what intuitions readers ought to have.  If, immediately after 
someone reads one of Pereboom’s four cases, this person has not yet decided whether or not to 
judge Plum morally responsible, their judgment could be significantly altered by what immediately 
follows the description of Cases 1 and 2; Pereboom (2014, p. 77) claiming that “…intuitively, he 
is not morally responsible for his decision.”  Furthermore, insofar as readers are unsure whether to 
judge Plum as morally responsible or not, it seems likely that readers are swayed by Pereboom 
because he is understood to be some kind of authority figure on what one ought to think about 
these cases.  Readers might agree with Pereboom’s judgment because he created these four cases 
and should therefore know enough about the relevant features and arguments to understand what 
the correct intuition is in a way that the reader themselves might think they are less capable.   
  
27 
If any such influences, either collectively or on their own, better explain why we (or the 
“agnostic reader”) find Plum intuitively not morally responsible in case 4, then Pereboom’s 
argument is unsuccessful because what precludes moral responsibility is not exclusively Plum’s 
actions being ultimately causally determined by factors outside his control (Condition 4 of 
Pereboom’s manipulation argument would not be satisfied).  Therefore, Pereboom, like anyone 
else attempting to make claims about what drives intuitions, needs to take unconscious 
psychological influences seriously because, as I have now demonstrated, neglecting to 
acknowledge seemingly irrelevant influences, such as order effects, can undermine one’s 
argument. 
In order to further elucidate importance of taking order effects into account, consider also 
the order in which information is presented within each case.  Those who use manipulation 
arguments to challenge compatibilism (Mele 1995; Pereboom 2014) begin the description of each 
case by explaining the manipulation and only afterwards mention how the manipulated agent still 
satisfied the compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility.  Contrastingly, those who draw 
compatibilist conclusions from manipulation cases (Sripada 2011) begin the description of their 
cases by explaining how the agent meets all compatibilist capacities and later mention the 
manipulation that takes place.  The fact that the order of presentation within cases seems to change 
in accordance with the conclusions one ends up drawing is telling, and it nicely complements my 
claim that the order of presentation likely has a significant effect on our intuitions.  Though I am 
not suggesting that any of the proponents of these manipulation cases knowingly present their 
cases this way to manipulate the readers, I share Wienberg’s concern about such order effects, and 
I too worry “that philosophers might be manipulating their own results without even being aware 
that such manipulation is taking place” (Weinberg et al. 2008). 
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5 OBJECTIONS AND EVIDENCE 
Above I argued that in his four-case manipulation argument, Pereboom fails to take into account 
several salient and largely unconscious psychological influences that have been shown to affect 
intuitions.  I argue that his argument does not elicit judgments about moral responsibility in the 
right way for those intuitions to support an argument for incompatibilism.  More specifically, I 
have argued that intuitions of Plum’s non-responsibility are best explained by factors other than 
the recognition that Plum’s actions are causally determined by factors outside of his control.  
Rather, a better explanation involves the presence of order effects that are driven by certain 
psychological influences which readers are largely unaware of, such as an agency-detection 
mechanism, third-party intent, and negative emotional engagement with earlier cases.  In this 
section I will consider objections to the argument I presented above. 
5.1 Order Effects Are Intended 
First, one might be tempted to object to my argument by saying something like the following: “Of 
course order effects sway intuitions in Pereboom’s favor.  The whole point of the four-case 
argument is to show people that when the features of determinism are presented less abstractly, we 
see that determinism undermines moral responsibility in the same way manipulation does.  
Therefore, the emotional responses and initial judgments about Case 1 should transfer over and 
influence intuitions about Case 4 because they allow us to think of these cases in the same way 
and with the same types of attitudes.”  
 In response to this objection, I would first point out that insofar as Pereboom’s four-case 
manipulation argument is to be understood as one that requires providing the best explanation for 
intuitions, the argument only works if Pereboom’s explanation is actually the best.  Therefore, if 
the fact that Plum’s actions are ultimately being determined by factors outside his control is what 
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drives intuitions, certainly order effects are not problematic for Pereboom.  If anything else 
motivates intuitions, then the argument simply doesn’t work.12  Therefore, it is important to know 
which feature of these cases do and do not motivate intuitions of non-responsibility.   
Mele (2005; 2008) has argued that readers would judge Plum not morally responsible even 
if the causation in these cases was indeterministic, and that demonstrating this this would show 
that determinism is not what motivates intuitions about the four cases.  If Mele is right and 
deterministic causation isn’t what drives intuitions, then these judgments must be sensitive to other 
factors.  I presented a few likely candidates for which features of these cases influence intuitions 
regarding Case 1: the presence of agents, third-party intent, and emotionally responding to 
manipulation. I also provided reason to believe that if the factors I discuss are what motivate 
intuitions about Case 1, then it’s highly likely that order effects will take place and intuitions of 
non-responsibility will remain consistent across cases.  Whereas Pereboom relies on his 
explanation of the cases to provide evidence that his explanation is best, I have provided a 
significant amount of empirical research which suggests an alternative explanation would better 
explain the our intuitions about the four cases.  Therefore, while Pereboom might have intended 
the order in which the presentations are introduced to affect intuitions, this would be a mistake 
unless it somehow allowed the reader to better understand determinism, which I provide reason to 
believe is not the case. 
 As a second response to the objection that order effects should occur, I’d point out that if 
order effects are intended to take place and we are supposed to understand Case 1 and Case 4 in 
roughly the same way, then Pereboom is likely confusing the reader about the true causal nature 
                                                          
12 For example, in all four cases, the agent being discussed is named Plum.  If (for some strange reason) 
readers will always judge that Plum is not morally responsible for the sole reason that his name is Plum, 
then every other feature of these cases is irrelevant and says nothing about what rules out moral 
responsibility.   
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of determinism.  As discussed earlier, if the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible in Case 
4 is residually influenced by the presence of agents or third-party intent in Case 1, then the 
intuitions about Case 4 are misguided, since determinism has no agential properties or intentions.  
Furthermore, concepts like determinism and moral responsibility are complex but do not seem to 
be so confusing that the “agnostic philosopher” can only grasp them through an analogous thought 
experiment.  Therefore, it seems that while Pereboom’s use of the four-case argument is 
superfluous to begin with, by incorporating many additional concepts (like intentional and agential 
manipulation) Pereboom is only confusing readers more about what determinism entails.  Readers 
of Pereboom’s four-case argument are likely conflating features such as agency and intent with 
determinism in Case 4 and, thus, are confused about the true nature of determinism. However, 
even if this is not the case, it seems extremely unlikely that judgments are best explained by the 
single feature Pereboom addresses, given the many other features present in Case 1 that are known 
to engage psychological mechanisms that lead to order effects and alter judgments of later cases.   
5.2 Explaining Intuitions is Unimportant 
Secondly, one might argue that by presenting Pereboom’s four-case argument as an argument that 
requires an explanation for what motivates intuitions, I am misrepresenting it.  After all, 
Pereboom’s four-case argument is a manipulation argument and some have argued that 
manipulation arguments can operate without any explicit premise that attempts to explain what 
motivates the non-responsibility intuition (Mele 2008; Todd 2012).  Many others have assumed 
that Pereboom’s argument ought to be conceived of in this way as well (Feltz 2013; McKenna 
2008; Mele 2005), and there seems to be some evidence that this is what Pereboom intends.  For 
example, in Pereboom’s most recent presentation of his four-case argument, he argues, 
It’s highly intuitive that Plum is not morally responsible in Case 1, and there 
are no differences between Cases 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 that can 
explain in a principled way why he would not be responsible in the former 
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of each pair but would be in the latter. We are thus driven to the conclusion 
that he is not responsible in Case 4. (2014, p. 79) 
 
This passage might lead one to assume Pereboom’s argument is similar to other manipulation 
arguments which roughly follow the formulation I described as MA.  MA does not include any 
premises about what explains judgments of non-responsibility and so one might think such an 
explanation is superfluous.  However, in addition to running counter to Pereboom’s stated 
intentions, I argue, as Mickelson (2015) does, that understanding a manipulation argument such as 
Pereboom’s to operate without any explanation for what drives intuitions about manipulation cases 
would be problematic. 
In order to understand why an explanation for intuitions is needed for the success of a 
manipulation argument, it is helpful to further investigate the methodology being employed with 
a manipulation argument.  The goal of manipulation arguments is to derive truths about moral 
responsibility from intuitions about moral responsibility.  That is, proponents of manipulation 
cases present the reader with scenarios, and (assuming the three conditions I described earlier are 
met) the proponent concludes that agents are not morally responsible.  If everyone gets the same 
intuition and the intuition is well-founded, then we would accept the conclusion that moral 
responsibility really is incompatible with determinism.  The point of manipulation cases then, is 
to find a way to demonstrate that moral responsibility is intuitively incompatible with determinism; 
by deriving conclusions about moral responsibility from intuitions about moral responsibility.  
Therefore, I argue that proponents of manipulation arguments endorse the Intuition Principle (If 
people consistently intuit X, then there is good reason to believe X is true.)  Given this 
methodology, what drives intuitions about moral responsibility is extremely relevant to moral 
responsibility.  Therefore, if our intuitions about manipulation cases are influenced by features of 
the cases that are independent of determinism and we accept the general methodology of 
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manipulation cases, then these features independent of determinism become relevant to moral 
responsibility in virtue of their ability to affect our intuitions. 
Additionally, in order for a manipulation argument to succeed, it must be the case that there 
are no relevant differences between cases.  That is, the feature which undermines responsibility in 
the first, second, or third case, must be the same feature which undermines responsibility in a case 
involving only determinism.  However, in order to determine which features of a manipulation 
case are relevant for moral responsibility, one must explain what in fact influences intuitions about 
these cases. If intuitions about Cases 1, 2, or 3 are influenced by factors that are not present in 
Case 4 (agents, intent, or emotionally responding to agents intentionally manipulating Plum) and 
if we understand features that influence intuitions to be relevant for moral responsibility, then these 
features become relevant.  If such features provide a relevant difference between cases, then P2 of 
MA (i.e. that there is no difference between the manipulated agent and an agent in a deterministic 
universe that is relevant for moral responsibility) does not hold.  For example, if the best 
explanation is the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible in Case 1 is that the intentions of 
the neuroscientists preclude Plum’s moral responsibility, then there is a relevant difference 
between Case 1 and Case 4.  If the best explanation for the intuition of non-responsibility is that 
there are agents present who determine Plum’s actions in Case 1, then M5 does not hold and again, 
there is a relevant difference between Case 1 and Case 4.  
It seems likely that if one were presented with a case in which an agent were successfully 
and intentionally manipulated by agents to do something, regardless of whether determinism were 
true, we would likely still have the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible.  If we suppose 
that what influences judgments of moral responsibility is relevant for moral responsibility, then 
one might argue that determinism is not incompatible with moral responsibility.  Rather, some 
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other factors that are present in the four-case argument would be incompatible with moral 
responsibility. 
Given that proponents of manipulation arguments are using intuitions regarding moral 
responsibility to draw conclusions about responsibility, we can use this methodology to determine 
whether or not features of determinism are actually what drive intuitions of non-responsibility.  If 
features of determinism aren’t what leads to the intuition that Plum lacks moral responsibility then 
it doesn’t seem determinism is what rules out moral responsibility in these cases and, the argument 
for incompatibilism fails.  As with most thought experiments, Pereboom’s four cases involve many 
features.  While all but a select few features are intended to be relevant, it is always possible that 
some other features which were not intended to affect intuitions do in fact motivate readers to 
judge that Plum is not morally responsible.  It is thus crucial to be able to sort out which features 
are important from those which are not. Although there may be some feature present in all four 
cases – for instance, the protagonist's name is “Plum” in all four cases – this is not yet enough to 
determine whether this feature is what drives intuitions.  While it may be the case that in all four 
of Pereboom’s cases Plum’s actions are causally determined by factors in over which he had no 
control, and it may even seem like this is a plausible explanation, the fact that this feature is shared 
among all cases is not enough to prove that it is in fact the best explanation for what drives 
intuitions.  Instead, we must consider alternative explanations for what motivates intuitions.  
Therefore, it is important to investigate what influences our intuitions and correctly ascertain what 
in fact motivates our intuitions. 
In addition to the methodological reasons I cite above for supposing that the four-case 
manipulation argument hinges crucially on a premise about what best explains our intuitions, this 
  
34 
is evidently also how Pereboom suggests that his argument should be understood.  In a footnote, 
Pereboom states, 
Al Mele (2006) argues that a manipulation argument against compatibilism 
need not be cast as an argument to the best explanation. I doubt that this is 
so. True, the argument can be represented without a best-explanation 
premise, but such a representation will not reveal its real structure. By 
analogy, the teleological argument for God [sic] existence can be 
represented as a deductive argument, but its real structure is an argument to 
the best explanation for biological order in the universe. The fact that the 
real structure of a manipulation argument against compatibilism is an 
argument to the best explanation becomes clear when one considers 
compatibilist objections to it—that, for, example, the non-responsibility 
intuitions can be accounted for by manipulation of a certain sort and not by 
causal determination. (2015, p. 79-80) 
Here Pereboom makes it clear that his argument is one in which the explanation of intuitions is 
paramount.  Furthermore, he states that the way one should object to his argument is by providing 
an alternative explanation for what else might explain our intuitions of Plum’s non-responsibility.  
This is precisely what I have attempted to do in this thesis. 
5.3 Providing Evidence for the Best Explanation 
Insofar as we need to determine which features of Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument 
drive intuitions of non-responsibility, it is important to note that the claims Pereboom and myself 
make about what best explains intuitions are empirically testable claims.  It’s possible for instance 
to design empirical studies that manipulate the features of these cases in order to determine what 
does and does not motivate intuitions.  Furthermore, we can test whether, after reading Pereboom’s 
four-case argument, readers correctly understand the true causal nature of determinism.  If it turned 
out that intuitions of Plum’s non-responsibility are directly driven by the fact that Plum’s actions 
are ultimately determined by factors outside his control, rather than any seemingly irrelevant 
features, and if after reading all four cases readers understand exactly what determinism entails, 
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then Pereboom’s argument would successfully avoid my criticisms. I doubt, however, that this is 
what we would find. 
One could simply manipulate the features within these cases and see if or how these 
changes affect intuitions regarding the extent to which Plum is morally responsible.13  By 
individually removing features and aspects of these four cases that may drive intuitions, and testing 
whether Plum is intuitively morally responsible, we could tease out which features influence 
judgments and, therefore, what best explains why we have the intuition that Plum is not morally 
responsible.   
Pereboom does not appear to be opposed to this type of investigation and remains confident 
that some of the factors I have discussed would turn out to be irrelevant to moral responsibility.   
Pereboom states, “If in these cases the manipulators were replaced by force fields or machines that 
randomly form in space that have the same deterministic effect on Plum as the manipulators do, 
the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible persists.” (2014, p. 82)  Therefore it seems 
Pereboom has no problem removing other features of the four-case argument to see if removing 
these features and changing aspects of the argument drastically alters intuitions of responsibility 
in the same fashion.  Given this, I see no reason why Pereboom should object to a systematic 
investigation of this sort – one that involved changing different aspects of how these cases are 
presented – to determine whether Pereboom’s explanation is indeed the best explanation for why 
we have the intuition that Plum lacks moral responsibility.   
Before describing how, exactly, we might experimentally determine whether Pereboom 
offers the “best explanation” for intuitions, it is worth addressing the difficulty in determining what 
                                                          
13 Here I am once again assuming first that the manipulation Pereboom describes is compatible with all the 
compatibilist requirements for moral responsibility, that readers find Plum intuitively not morally 
responsible, and that readers are properly understanding determinism and all of the relevant components of 
Pereboom’s four cases. 
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“best explains” what drives intuitions of non-responsibility, given the fact that our intuitions are 
subject to so many factors.  For instance, if one were to demonstrate that the order in which the 
cases are presented had some effect, it would be too quick to jump to the conclusion that order 
effects best explain what motivates our intuitions.  Similarly, if we found that having one’s actions 
determined by factors outside their control significantly influenced intuitions, this would not be 
enough to conclude that this feature best explains why we have these intuitions either.  Rather, it 
seems that the proper way to assess whether Pereboom is right about what best motivates intuitions 
of non-responsibility in Pereboom’s four cases would be to examine all of the features of these 
cases that do drive intuitions of non-responsibility and determine whether the intuitions are most 
significantly influenced by understanding that Plum’s actions are ultimately determined by factors 
outside of his control or if intuitions are more significantly altered by some combination of other 
factors that are independent of determinism, such as the order in which the cases are presented, the 
presence of agents intentionally manipulating Plum, or an emotional response to such 
manipulation. 
In order to investigate to what extent intuitions are affected by different aspects of the four-
case argument, we could slightly alter these cases and the way they are presented and measure how 
much these changes affect judgments of Plum’s non-responsibility.  After presenting the cases 
independently to get a baseline for what intuitions readers have about these cases, we could present 
the cases unaltered in their regular order and in the reverse order (Case 4 first and Case 1 last) to 
see what effect order had on intuitions.  Assuming that readers of at least some of these cases do 
in fact get the intuition that Plum lacks moral responsibility (and Pereboom’s manipulation cases 
satisfy Condition 2), we could next flip the order in which the information within each case is 
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presented (describe Plum’s compatibilist capacities first and the manipulation last) and see if this 
has any effect on intuitions.  
With this information available, we could then begin to slightly modify the cases to see 
what the intuitions actually track.  For example, we could do as Mele suggests and present 
scenarios where determinism is false and agents have, to a minimal degree, the kind of free will 
that Pereboom thinks would allow for moral responsibility.  If everything in the cases remained 
the same but Plum had some minimal sense of agent-causal free will (which Pereboom argues is 
necessary for moral responsibility) and yet readers have the intuition that Plum is not morally 
responsible, then we can conclude that it isn’t the fact that Plum’s actions are ultimately being 
determined by factors outside his control that motivates intuitions of non-responsibility.  We could 
also replace the manipulators with force fields or machines, see if intent influences judgments, and 
even vary the extent to which it matters if the manipulators' intent matches the action that Plum 
performs.  Of course, we would also need to verify that the subjects are not mistakenly attributing 
intent to these new manipulators and that their responses are not due merely to an earlier emotional 
response influencing judgments (Waller 3013; Weigmann et al. 2012).14 
                                                          
14 Björnsson (in preparation) reports to have constructed a scenario where all compatibilist conditions for 
responsibility are met but where the cause of manipulation is an infection instead of the result of agents and 
that this non-intentional manipulator undermined attributions of free will and moral responsibility to the 
same degree as intentional manipulation cases.  This study seems to be problematic for my account in that 
it suggests that agents and intent might not provide a better explanation for what motivates intuitions of 
non-responsibility in Pereboom’s four-case argument.  However, I am not necessarily arguing that agents 
or intent undermine responsibility.  All I need for my argument to work is that the intuition that Plum is not 
morally responsible is the result of psychological influences such as order effects and not the result of 
readers recognizing that Plum’s actions are causally determined by factors over which he ultimately has no 
control.  I have previously discussed evidence which supports the claim that agential intent does influence 
intuitions of non-responsibility (Philips and Shaw forthcoming; Waller 2013).  Providing evidence that 
intent does not best explain what motivates intuitions fails to demonstrate that features of determinism do 
motivate intuitions of non-responsibility.  Nonetheless, in order for Pereboom’s argument to work the latter 
must be the case.   
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Additionally, it would be useful to measure – and even manipulate – the readers’ emotional 
state before, during, and after reading each case, in order to ascertain whether having an emotional 
response of one kind or another influences judgments of responsibility, and whether emotionally 
responding to earlier cases influences later judgments.  This has become a standard methodology 
in psychological studies on moral judgments.  Furthermore, by presenting readers with different 
kinds of cases, one would know which features of these cases readers might be emotionally 
responding to (if any at all).  Last, we could investigate whether readers understand determinism 
after reading the four-case argument – as Pereboom claims is the goal – or whether it in fact causes 
readers to become confused and assume that Plum’s  compatibilist capacities are being bypassed 
or that they simply don’t exist.  Either by asking follow-up questions or by asking for the reader 
to provide a written description of what occurred in the cases, we could investigate whether readers 
are conflating determinism with bypassing, or if they have some other problematic understanding 
that signifies that Pereboom’s manipulation argument fails to satisfy Condition 3 (see Murray and 
Nahmias 2014). 
Noticing differences in intuitions as a result of altering the presentation of these cases 
would not be definitive proof that I am right.  Pereboom and I agree that things like the order in 
which the cases will have an effect on intuitions and our understandings of the argument.  If, 
however, intuitions were more significantly altered by a collection of factors that are not the 
product of understanding that Plum’s actions are ultimately determined by factors that are beyond 
his control, or if Pereboom’s presentation leads readers to erroneously understand Plum’s 
compatibilist capacities or the true nature of determinism, as I argue is likely the case, then the 
intuition that Plum lacks moral responsibility is better explained by these factors and Pereboom 
fails to provide the best explanation for what drives intuitions.  Given the importance of correctly 
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explaining what drives intuitions for Pereboom’s argument, by failing to consider these alternative 
explanations for what might motivate intuitions about his four cases, Pereboom fails to show that 
his explanation for intuitions is the best.  If I am right and intuitions are being driven by alternative 
features of these cases, then Pereboom’s argument fails.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to demonstrate that arguments which depend on intuitions about thought 
experiments and hypothetical cases must offer a correct explanation for what features of the cases 
are motivating intuitions regarding the cases.   I argued that psychological influences we are largely 
unaware of, such as order effects, can sometimes be significant enough to undermine arguments 
which employ these thought experiments.  Without ensuring that our intuitions are tracking 
relevant features of an argument, intuitions regarding thought experiments will likely be unreliable 
and, therefore, fruitless for the purposes of certain kinds of philosophical debates.  To exemplify 
these concerns, I presented Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.  I provided 
evidence that suggests intuitions of moral responsibility in these four cases are better explained by 
order effects, likely driven by various irrelevant features such as agency detection, than by 
Pereboom’s claim that the manipulation cases help readers recognize that Plum’s actions are 
causally determined by factors outside of his control.  It is possible Pereboom’s argument may 
meet the first three conditions I argue are necessary to demonstrate a problem for compatibilism 
and thereby still succeed in providing a counterexample for the compatibilist account of moral 
responsibility.  Nonetheless, if Pereboom failing to correctly identify what explains intuitions in 
the four-case manipulation argument, Pereboom positive argument for incompatibilism is 
unsuccessful. That is, if what leads one to judge Plum as not morally responsible is something that 
is not a feature of determinism (such as order effects that are motivated by an agency-detection 
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mechanism, an intent-tracking mechanism, or an emotional response to earlier cases), then it is not 
determinism that precludes moral responsibility in these cases and we have no reason to believe 
that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. 
 In response to those who might argue that order effects are intended to occur in Pereboom’s 
four-case argument, I have argued that if the order effects are intended, then not only do features 
of determinism not provide the best explanation for what drives intuitions of non-responsibility, 
but that readers are likely being confused about what determinism entails.  Furthermore, to those 
who object that proponents of manipulation cases do not require an explanation for what drives 
intuitions, in addition to demonstrating that Pereboom also understands his argument to require an 
explanation for intuitions, I have argued that the methodology employed by proponents of 
manipulation cases entails that what influences intuitions is relevant for moral responsibility.  
Therefore, insofar as a manipulation case is attempting to show that determinism precludes moral 
responsibility, we need to be sure that a feature of determinism (and not something else) is what 
motivates intuitions.  If the intuitions are the result of other features or psychological influences, 
as I have suggested, then we lack evidence that determinism rules out moral responsibility. 
My argument does not necessarily defend the compatibilist account of moral responsibility, 
nor does it suggest that our intuitions are too variable to be useful in philosophical study.  Rather, 
I am providing reason for philosophers who rely on intuitions about thought experiments to 
consider the salience of subtle psychological influences when attempting to correctly explain what 
drives intuitions in thought experiments.  One must take seriously the fact that our intuitions are 
influenced by many seemingly irrelevant factors when attempting to use thought experiments or 
hypothetical cases to provide support for an argument. Just as a good scientist considers all 
confounding variables before claiming to know the cause of a certain event, so too philosophers 
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must control for potential confounding factors in their hypothetical examples to ensure that they 
do not mis-identify what factors lead them to have the intuitions that they end up having. 
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